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COI'IENTS
CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION-ITS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE.-One of the
long unsolved' and impending social, economic and industrial questions of our
day and place is the relation of the child to industry-the vexations and complex
problem of child labor. Events of late have rendered more complicated and
diverse the proposals aiming to limit or prohibit the entrance and continuance
of children in industrial employment. The contrasted solutions are being
evaluated and assayed in the crucible of legislative halls, constitutional conven-
tions and public debates.2 Herein will be considered present and future aspects
of child labor and the comparative merits and shortcomings of the pending
constitutional and legislative remedies.
Introduction
A comprehensive study of child labor is incomplete without an investigation
into the status of the child in the great civilizations of the past. Most pertinent
to this inquiry are the highly developed civilizations of Sparta, Athens and Rome.
In each of these societies there existed, common to all, three great social classes;
agricultural populations; 3 guildsmen, 4 both artisans and merchants; and the
ruling and professional classes. In general, the education and care extended by
each of these groups to its children were only that which seemed necessary to
enable them to maintain themselves in the social class into which they were
born.0 These distinct social cleavages strongly conditioned the rights and
privileges of the child.
In ancient Sparta7 and Rome the child was regarded solely as material for
citizenship, to be trained primarily for future service to the state and subservient
to the will and control of the government. The Spartan child was disciplined
1. The first legislative attempts to solve the problem of child labor began in 1802.
See notes 18, 19, infra.
2. The original child labor amendment, the Vandenberg substitute, the Uniform Child
Labor Act, the Wheeler-Johnson Bill, the Black-Connery Bill, are all pznding measures,
the fate of which will be derided in the near future.
3. BREASTED, A.ciF-,T Tn" s (1916) 282; DAVIs, DAY I:; Om ATnr-s (1914) 191, 51;
Fi--G, SouRcE BooK or GREEK HISORY (1907) 58-97; SuownsaN, ETEr..,%L Ro!sz
(1925) 138.
4. BREsTD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 301; DAvIS, op. cit. sittra note 3, at 92; Tnoas;-
DIKE, SHORT HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION (1929) 112, 113.
5. DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 77; TucKRE, LIFE nz THE Romvu. Wo.ua (1910)
193, 23S.
6. BOTSFORD, HELLENIC HISTORY (1932) 404-437; Article on Child Wd!fare, 3 E t.c cLo-
PEDiA OF SOcIAL SCIEqcES (1931) 504.
7. BosroR, SouRcE BooK or A cI NT HIsroa (1929) 112; IRvnxo, CATFzCM.T OF
GREcIA,N AxnQun-s (1824) 53; LA%=EL, BIORPYIr OF THE GREEK PEOPLE (1934) 50-52;
THoRNDiKE, SHORT HISTORY OF CIVILZATION (1929) 107-109.
S. BOTSFORD, HISTORY oF ROiE (1928) 335; PowLER, RomE (1912) 55-83; TYcREU,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 314.
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to endure immeasurable hardships and suffering.0 The harsh rule of pairia
potestas'° in Roman law gave the head of the household almost unrestricted
power over all the children of the family group. The Romans did, however,
extend through the pueri alimentarii semi-official charitable aid to suffering
children."' In Athens, more respect and regard for the rights of childhood were
present. The Athenian child's life was carefully guided and the objective of his
education was the furtherance of a harmonious development of body and mind.
12
Under the Canon law the child occupies a highly important and distinct
position in relation to and in the advancement of Christianity, the Church and
society. To insure this successful development, Canon law has conferred upon
the child certain basic rights and privileges, the execution of which the parents
are under a moral and religious duty and obligation to realize. "Parents are
under the gravest kind of obligation to provide to the best of their ability for
the religious and moral as well as the physical and civic education of their
children and for their temporal well being."' 3 This natural law is based on the
fact that not only procreation, but also the education of children belong to the
primary end of marriage. The enforcement of such a program undeniably
elevates the child to a relatively superior plane and places him beyond the reach
of deterrent factors.
14
The humanist movement in the eighteenth century expressed the belief in
the equal rights of all children to education and health., Expression of this
belief may be found in Rousseau's "Emile," often called the "Children's
Charter," which is a declaration of the rights of childhood. Against this
humanitarian background and utterly hostile thereto, suddenly appeared the
exploitation and abuses of children resulting from the rapid growth of industry
in England at the end of that century.'8
The first real importation of children into industry in England began in 1769
when the first patent for a machine for spinning cotton was obtained.'x Indica-
tive that the machine was responsible for child labor abuses, is the fact that in
9. M.LS, Boox or TE ANCIENT GREEES (1925) 75-90; TXORNDIxE, op. cit. siupra
note 7, at 78; 3 UNIVERSAL ANTHOLoGY (1899) 106.
10. GREENE, THE ACMEVEMENT OF ROME (1933) 89; PowLER, Roxe (1912) 58, 59;
Comment (1936) 5 FORDHIAm L. REV. 460, 461.
11. BOTSrORD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 337; GREENE, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 116, 117.
12. BREASTED, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 291, 307; DAVIS, DAY IN OLD ATUENs (1914)
57-75; LAvELL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 66; MILLS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 221-231;
QUENNELL, EVERYDAY THINGS IN ARCHAIC GREECE (1931) 125-144; 2 UNIVERSAL ATuOLOOY
(1899) 93.
13. Canon 113: Parentes gravissima obligatione tenentur prolis educationen; turn
religiosam et moralem, turn physicarn et civilem pro viribus curandi, et etianp temporati
eorum bono providendi. 5 AUGUsTINE, A CoMENTARY ON CANON LAW (1923) 330. See
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 at 535 (1924). "The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him" and direct his destiny have the rlght,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
14. 5 AuGusTINE, loc. cit. supra note 13; SLATER, POINTS OF CHuRCH LAW (1924) 113;
WAYWOOD, A PAcTcAL COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW (1925) 703.
15. Article on Child Welfare, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA or SocIL= SCIENcES (1931) 506.
16. SCHIRO, MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY EuROPEAN HISTORY (1929) 21, 25.
17. NVILLOUG1BY, CnILD LABOR, 5 AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION (1890) 13.
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1802 was enacted the first child protective legislation1 8 This was followed by
the Act of 1819.19
In the early American colonies industry in the modem sense was unknown,
the factory not having as yet developed in America or in Europe. There was,
however, much manufacturing of a crude sort to supply the bare necessaries.?
Even this pre-factory era was characterized by the labor of children at early
ages and for long hoursY' In areas far removed from the larger towns, the
work of subduing the wilderness and establishing the economic position of the
family was of necessity shared by the women and cliildren.2-
Colonial industry was for a time unresponsive to the English Industrial
Revolution. In the United States, the factory system and the new industrial
order date from 1790 when Samuel Slater built a mill in Rhode Island. 3 The
factories established at this time, unlike those in England, did not find any large
class of poverty stricken workers who had no choice but to seek employment for
themselves or their children in the mills 24 Because of the shortage of labor in the
colonies, there grew up the practice of kidnapping or "spiriting" children and
adults of the laboring class from England.2 The majority of the employees in
the early factories were children of tender years secured mainly from almshouses
and neighboring farms; whole families were often employed under a single wage
agreement.20 Other primary sources of labor were free indented servants,
convicts and vagabonds. The southern tobacco and rice growers, to supply
their own labor needs, commenced the use of negro slaves both adult and
children 27
Under the stimulus that colonial commerce and industry received from the
Embargo and War of 1812, the Industrial Revolution in America began.P
The labor conditions were not very creditable. At this time two-thirds of all
the employees in the cotton mills were women or children.20
18. THE Haxr-mLTH Am Mosis ACT To REGuA T.r nH LxoR or BouhiD Cxmrn=.; rr Corro:z
FACToRIEs. This Act forbade the binding out of children younger than 9 years, reztricted
the hours to 12 actual working hours a day and prohibited night work.
19. This Act also applied only to cotton mills but extended protection to other than
bound children.
20. ADA. rS, PRovcLr, Socmry (1927) 131; BAssETT, A SHOT Hisron or TH
Ur rmD STATES (1925) 137, 140, 349; 5 LARNm, NaW L..%ar Hmsory (1923) 43S5.
21. Artice on Child Labor, 3 ENcycLoprE.D or SoC=L. Scn;crs (1930) 412; 1rce
also, Du ao AN'D DF--r, EN0oisH APPRr.'cr.snxp AND C'rrn Loun (1912);
Hurc cs AN-D HMRiusox, 10 A H sToRy oF m FACTORY LrGIsr.LATxo (2nd ed. 1911) is.
22. A.Ams, op. cit. supra note 20, at 131 et seq.; GRE.E, Pno-rvcrA. A=ni c%
(1905) 270.
23. Article on Child Labor, op. cit. supra note 21, at 414; I.AR',, loc. cit. supra
note 20.
24. Article on Child Labor, loc. cit. supra note 21.
25. BAssrr, A SHoRT HI-ToRY oF THE UNnm STLTEs (1925) 137, 140; Wmxr-
BAcEER, Fr A-CAs caNs (1927) 24.
26. OSGOOD, HISTORY OF INDUsTRY (1878) 372-375; see also, LoDr, Suont HIsTory or
ma ENGISH CoLoIES (1881).
27. See note 25, supra.
28. FoPumA, ADvsa.cm Am cA HisTORT (1919) 105, 160; Article on Child Labor,
loc. cit. supra note 21; BASsErT", loc. cit. supra note 20.
29. AsE=, Am c.r HiSTORy (1920) 113; FoRtmA, loc. cit. sura note 28.
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I. STATUTORY ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE CHILD LABOR
The history of child labor legislation in the United States reveals a gallant
battle fought by social reformers to combat the evils of child labor. When
the practice of employing children for long hours, in unhealthy atmospheres had
become an acute social problem, steps to find a solution were taken. Naturally
enough the reformers turned to their various state legislatures for aid. Regula-
tory legislation began to be passed about 1850,80 but no substantial prohibitions
were enacted until the beginning of the twentieth century. 31 During the years
from 1879 to 1889, the typical minimum age for legal employment in manu-
facturing industries, incorporated in state statutes, was ten years. During the
next decade it was twelve, and in the period extending from 1899 to 1909 it was
raised to fourteen. The maximum hours which these child workers were allowed
to labor was, on the average, 9 hours a day and 54 hours a week.8 2 But
progress in securing such legislation was slow and its enforcement was not
stringent.38 Communities depended on factories for their economic sustenance and
the competition between the states to have industries locate within their borders
was keen. The threat of the exploiters to remove their plants to states with
lower standards of social legislation sounded the death knell to many a drive for
reform.3 4 When the census count of 191035 showed no decrease in the number
of child workers, the reformers turned to Congress for the enactment of Federal
regulations as the better means of handling the problem.
Their efforts finally culminated in the passage in 1916 of a bill entitled "An
Act to prevent interstate commerce in the products of child labor and for other
purposes."38 By this law Congress sought to prohibit child labor in factories
and mines by an exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce. The
act was short-lived, for two years later the Supreme Court declared the law
unconstitutional in the celebrated case of Hammer v. Dagenhart. 7 Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, McKenna and Clarke dissented. The ruling of the court in
this case was a serious set-back to the cause of child labor reform and many
doubts were expressed as to the soundness of the opinion of the majority of the
court.3 8 This adverse decision served only as a check in the drive for federal
legislation regulating child labor. Congress attempted again to exercise its
control over the subject, this time by the method of taxation. The Child Labor
Tax Law of 191939 imposed a prohibitory tax upon manufacturers employing
child labor. This law was enacted only to meet the fate of its predecessor, being
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case of Bailey v. Drexel
30. See LOUGHRAN, HIsToRIcAL DEVELOPMIENT OF CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION (1921)
18, 69, 73.
31. Id. at 18.
32. For authority for this and the preceding facts see LOUcHRAN, HISTORICAL DEvo P-
MENT or CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1921) 7.
33. FULLER, CHILD LABOR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1923) 25.
34. CALCOTT, CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION (1931) 49.
35. The census count of 1910 listed 1.990,225 children as gainfully employed.
ABSTRACT OF THE FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES (1930) 369.
36. 39 STAT. 675 (1916).
37. 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
38. For a discussion of this case see p. 233, infra.
39. 40 STAT. 1138 (1919).
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Furnitvre Co.40 The purpose of Congress was obviously not to collect revenue
by means of this law but was to exert a police power in a matter not within
federal jurisdiction. This legislation dearly exceeded the taxing power given
to Congress which was granted by the Constitution solely for the purpose of
revenue.4 ' To have held otherwise would enable Congress to exact penalties
under the guise of taxation and thus usurp the police power which the separate
states expressly retained by the Constitution.
As a result of these setbacks, proponents of child labor reform began their
successful efforts to have Congress recommend a child labor amendment to the
Constitution. But while the debate aroused by the form of the amendment was
being waged in the nation, Congress essayed another attempt at Federal control
of the problem by the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act. 2 Child
labor provisions were incorporated in the codes sent to the President for his
approval. The principal feature of restriction was the minimum age of 16
agreed upon in most of the codes.4 3 The cause of the children received another
setback when the act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,"4
two years after its passage by Congress.
II. THE PROPOSED A=MND3MNT OF 1924
As a result of the declarations of the Supreme Court holding unconstitutional
the first two attempts of Congress to deal effectively with the problem of child
labor, a determined campaign was initiated to have a child labor amendment
added to the Constitution. This was regarded as the only means left by which
to obtain the objective of federal regulation of child labor. Some twenty-four
forms of amendments were submitted to the Judiciary Committee of the House
of Representatives, drafted largely by outside groups desirous of child labor
regulations.45  The proposed amendment in its present form was submitted to
Congress and on June 2, 1924, by authority of Article V of the Constitution,
which gives to Congress the power to initiate amendments "whenever two-thirds
of both Houses shall deem it necessary," the amendment was proposed to the
various states for ratification. It immediately met with stubborn opposition and
provoked a bitter national controversy which has lasted to the present day.
Progress in the fight for ratification was practically at a standstill in the
nine years following its submission. Approval of one state was obtained in
1924,46 three more in 1925. 4 7 By March 5, 1925, thirteen states, a number
40. 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
41. It would seem from the very language of the Constitution that no taxing power
was given to Congress for the purpose of police regulation. The ruling of the court
in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. distinguishes an earlier decision of the same court in
United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919). For an excellent dicusJon of ths
case see Sutherland, The Child Labor Cases and the Constjition (1923) 8 Cora.. L. Q.
33S, at 350.
42. 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1927).
43. Basic Code, NRA Release No. 6367, July 12, 1934.
44. A. L. A. Schecter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
45. See Report of House Hearing on Child Labor Amendment (1924).
46. Arkansas. For complete record of action by states on the child labor amend-
ment see (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 827.
47. Arizona, California and Wisconsin.
19381
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sufficient to defeat ratification, had affirmatively rejected the amendment. 48
Only two more certified their ratification in the intervening years to 1933.40 In
that year the all but stalled campaign was given the impetus of the approval and
cooperation of the New Deal and the effect was so great that the end of the year
saw fourteen states 0 signify their assent to the incorporation of the amendment
into the Constitution. This landslide of approvals awoke the dormant opposition
to the peril of their situation, and despite the intensified campaigns of the pro-
ponents of the amendment in eleven state legislatures during 1934 their efforts
resulted in failures in every instance.5 ' The year 1935 saw the conflict waged
more bitterly and successes were recorded by the advocates of ratification in four
more states.52 No states ratified in 1936 but four more58 certified their approval
in 1937 bringing the total at present to twenty-eight, eight short of the requisite
thirty-six. Additional ratifications might be forthcoming in 1938 with the re-
convening of seven state legislatures54 besides the possibility of others meeting in
special sessions.55
Thus the still uncompleted process of ratifying this proposed amendment has
extended over a period of thirteen years and eleven months. This is in startling
contrast to the period of three years and six months required for the ratification
of the Sixteenth Amendment which was the longest period of time that the process
of ratifying an amendment had previously necessitated. The reason for the long
delay has been the determined opposition of a large body of American citizenship
to the amendment's becoming part of the Constitution. The objections of the
opposition are generally three: (1) criticism of the language in which the amend-
ment is phrased; (2) fear that ratification will effect a weakening of states'
rights and a centralization of power in the federal government; and (3) belief
that there is no necessity for a child labor amendment.
The language of the amendment which gave rise to the great protest against
its ratification is contained in Section I:
"The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate and prohibit the labor of
persons under eighteen years of age."56
In making an analysis of this language, the rules of statutory construction
should be observed. Courts are not inclined to go beyond the evident, un-
ambiguous meaning of the language of the enactment, if its phrasing is of such
quality.57 It is the contention of the opposition that the language contained in
48. At the close of 1925, thirty-five states had rejected the amendment.
49. Montana (1927), Colorado (1931).
50. Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington and West Virginia.
51. Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, New
York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia.
52. Idaho, Indiana, Utah and Wyoming.
53. Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada and New Mexico.
54. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina
and Virginia. New York again rejected the amendment in 1938.
55. Kentucky so ratified at a special session in 1937.
56. Sec. 2 of the proposed amendment reads: "The power of the several States Is
unimpaired by this article, except that the operation of State laws shall be suspended
to the extent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress."
57. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 22 (1905).
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Section I clearly and indisputably vests in Congress unlimited and supreme
power over the physical activities of all persons under eighteen years of age.
It would seem that this conclusion is correct after a consideration of the phrasing
in Section I and in particular the words "prohibit", "regulate" and "labor".
The inclusion of "prohibit" confers a general unrestricted grant of power to
Congress to control the labor of all persons under eighteen years of age. On the
basis of a ruling of the Supreme Court in McCidlock v. Maryland,5s the words
"limit" and "regulate" might be construed to vest in Congress the power to make
only appropriate limitations and regulations. But because of the insertion of the
word "prohibit", the amendment would give Congress a complete power to reg-
ulate without qualification and would make the national legislature sole arbiter
of the measures to be adopted.
Conferring upon Congress the power to make prohibitions in the field of child
labor legislation is not objectionable in itself 9 if the prohibitions were limited to
the abuses to be abolished, but this broad grant would seem unwarranted and
could be subjected to grave abuses.
Labor
The use of the term "labor" in the form of the amendment has been the
principal cause of the great opposition it has evoked. This broad term was in-
serted in preference to "employment", which was used in the two previous enact-
ments of Congress seeking to regulate child labor. It was the intent of the
framers that, by the inclusion of the word "labor", the amendment would
empower Congress to reach into the home and regulate labor upon farmsPCO
The purpose of such a vast grant was to enable Congress to prohibit "industrial
homework"'I and to regulate the analogous situations in agriculture where whole
families are hired but only the parents receive pay.02 Thus, in order to insure
that Congress would have power to cope with this evil, which affects only an
infinitesimal portion of our youth, the language of the amendment was made so
broad as to destroy the parental right of authority over their offspring.0 That
58. 4 Wheat. 316, 413 (U. S. 1319).
59. It is to be noted that the alternative child labor amendment submitted by
Senato'r Vandenberg (75 Cong. 1st Sess.; S. J. Res. 144) contains the word "prohibit"
but the grant of power is restricted to persons under 16 years of age and confines
the scope of Congrelsional action to the "employment for hire of persons. . . . For
a discussion of this proposed alternative amendment see infra, pp. 230.
60. See Sen. Rep. on the Child Labor Amendment, p. 39 (1924).
61. "Industrial homework" is the manufacturing in a home, in whole or in part,
with material which has been furnished by an employer, of any article or articles to be
returned to the employer. It is the usual procedure in this practice for one member
of the family to receive the pay and conduct the relations with the employer although
other members of the household (usually children) join in the manufacturing.
62. See Burlingham, The Need for a Federal Clld Labor Amendment (1935) 21
A. B. A. J. 214, 216.
63. Further evidence of the intention of the framers to give to Congreas as broad
powers as possible is the unreasonably high age limit of eighteen years contained in
the amendment. Youths of sixteen and seventeen could be prevented from entering
trades or aiding in their education by having "odd" jobs after school. The reason
such a high age limit was fixed was to enable Congress to deal with older boys and
girls engaged in hazardous occupations. See Sen. Rep. on the Child Labor Amend-
1938]
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the ratification of this amendment would give, and was intended to give, Congress
the power to reach into the home and suspend the rights of parents over children
is apparent from an examination of the following proposed additions to the
amendment which were rejected by Congress:
(1) "But no law enacted under this article shall affect in any way the labor
of any child or children on the farm of the parent or parents."' 4
(2) "Provided, that no law shall control the labor of any child in the house,
or business, or on the premises connected therewith, of the parent or parents."0 0
The conclusion that the power to "limit, regulate and prohibit the labor of
persons under eighteen years of age," would cede to Congress complete control
of the physical labors of persons under eighteen would seem to be inescapable
despite reassuring statements to the contrary.00 If the amendment became a
part of our Constitution, and Congress prohibited the labor of all persons under
eighteen, whether in the home or otherwise, 7 there would seem to be no ground
ment, pp. 18, 19 (1924). It would seem that if a general grant of control up to
sixteen years had been provided, with an increase to eighteen years in the case of
hazardous occupations, the age range could be more readily defended.
Proponents of the amendment dismiss objections that the amendment grants too
broad powers to Congress, by declaring that the amendment is only an enabling act
and that if Congress passed unreasonable legislation it could be easily repealed. See
N. Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1934, § viii, p. 3, col. 3. Even if this contention could justify
the broad language of the amendment, it would seem unwarranted. The history of
legislative bodies reveals a tendency on their part to exert the powers that they possess
to the ultimate degree.
64. 65 CONG. REC. 7293 (1924).
65. 65 CONG. Rac. 7292 (1924). The following proposed amendment was likewise
rejected: "The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of
persons under 16 years of age, but no labor of such persons in the homes and on the
farms where they reside."
66. "The amendment gives Congress power only over the labor of children for hire,
and nothing else. It would not give Congress power to send inspectors any place except
where work for hire was being carried on, and therefore Congress would have absolutely
no power to send inspectors into families, schools or churches any more than it has now,"
Secretary of Labor, Miss Perkins, N. Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1934, § viii, p. 3, col. 5.
67. Proponents argue that since the states never prohibited all labor of children In
the home, Congress would not undertake such a task. It is submitted that the States
do not now possess power to enact such legislation, being prohibited by the due process
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1924).
It is also contended that laws prohibiting all labor in the home would not be passed by
Congress because the enforcement of such a law would entail great difficulties. Remem-
bering the lengths to which Congress was permitted to go in seeking to enforce the
Eighteenth Amendment, could it not be urged with reason that, since Congress has
power to prohibit all labor, it could require youths under eighteen to spend terms in
camps similar to the C.C.C. as a reasonable means of enforcement of this prohibition?
Since one of the aims of the abolition of child labor is to reduce our "standing army"
of unemployed by having them take over the work the children formerly did, such a
statute could be reasonably upheld as constitutional under the proposed amendment. See,
Everhard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545, 559 (1924); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272
U. S. 581, 604 (1926); Ruppert v. Coffey, 251 U. S. 264 (1919).
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on which an objection to the validity of such a statute could be based.cs The
due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment would be complied with by the
ratification of the clear and unambiguous language of the amendment.
Education
But it is not even possible to state safely that the language of the amendment
could be so narrowly construed as only to include the physical activities of
"persons under eighteen years of age." Grave fears are felt among the opposition
that the ratification of this amendment would also cede to Congress the right
to control the education of the youth of the nation. This apprehension seems
to have a solid basis in legal fact. Labor in a non-legal sense is commonly used
to include mental activity and has been so defined by leading dictionaries. 2
This fact is important, for the Supreme Court has declared "Words in a con-
stitution . . . are always to be given the meaning they have in common use,
unless there are very strong reasons to the contrary.) 70 Legally, the term labor
has been usually held to signify physical toil."' However, it is generally
recognized that it is a comprehensive word of very extensive meaning.7-2 Courts
68. It has been submitted that the courts will construe the word "labor" in the sense
of child labor. And that since "child labor" is a restrictive term implying in its legal
meaning the gainful labor of children at unfit ages, for unreasonable hours or under
unwholesome conditions, there is no fear of a broad interpretation. See Wait, The Child
Labor Arnendnuent (1925) 9 Mnma. L. REv. 179. It would seem that such an assumption
is unwarranted for how can it be explained that the use of the word "child" or "children"
was studiously avoided in drafting the amendment although the two prior acts of Congress
regulating child labor employed them? The title "Child Labor Amendment" was not con-
ferred by Congress but grew out of later discussion. See (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 14.
Some proponents of the amendment urge that the use of the word "labor" will p2rmit
Congress to control only those persons who are "laborers" within the narrow legal con-
struction given to that term. Reference to dictionaries vll show the difficulty of sustain-
ing such a construction. See Paddock v. Balgord, 2 S. D. lCD, 4S N. W. S40, 841 (1S91),
"'Labor' either as a noun or a verb, is a comprehensive word, and does not seem to carry
to its derivative, 'laborer,' as ordinarily used, its full original meaning."
69. SHORTER OXKoRD ENGIsH DicroNAnR oz, HIsTron cL Przcnr.rms (1936) (1. Bodily
or mental toil); FuNK A.D WAcn. u,'s, NEw Srn=. Di'onA or Vic EncLisil
LANGUAGE (1930) (1. Physical or mental efforts, particularly for some useful or desired
end). WiRBsTrns NEw LNTERN,.ATiONAL DIcroz.%y (1926) (1. Physical or mental toil;
bodily or intellectual exertion, esp., fatiguing, painful, irksome, or unavoidable). Theze
dictionaries list other alternative definitions but it is to he noted that those selected were
placed first.
70. Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 139, 147 (1886).
71. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457 (1892); Ex parte
Aird, 276 Fed. 954 (E. D. Pa. 1921); United States v. Union Bank of Canada, 262 Fed.
91 (C. C. A. 2d 1919) ; In re Ho King, 14 Fed. 724 (D. C. Ore. 1883); Wakefield v. Fargo,
90 N. Y. 213 (1882); Hovey V. Ten Broeck, 26 N. Y. Super. CL 316 (1865); Cavanaugh
v. Art Hardware Co., 124 Wash. 243, 214 Pac. 152 (1923); Beald ey v Lind, 32 S. IV.
(2d) 671 (Tex. 1930); Moore v. American Industrial Co., 138 N. C. 304, 50 S. E. 6S7
(1905); Wildner v. Ferguson, 42 Minn. 112, 43 N. W. 794 (1889); Brockway v. Innes,
39 Mich. 47 (1878). 1
72. Massachusetts Bonding Ins. Co. v. Steele, 293 S. W. 647, 648 (Tex. 1927); Crook
v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 593, 136 S: E. 565 (1927); Commonwealth v. Connor Co., 222
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have cited with approval definitions of labor which declare it to include mental
activity.73 Thus, there is a plausible basis for the fear that educational
activities could be regulated through the presence of the expansive term labor in
the pending amendment. 74
If such an interpretation were placed on the word labor, the ratification of this
amendment would be a great calamity. Centralization of education in a federal
bureaucracy is to be avoided to prevent stagnation of an independent spirit of
learning. Moreover, if the amendment gives Congress the control over education,
it would seem that it would also have power to dictate that all youths attend
public schools and thus abolish schools where religion is included as part of the
curriculum.75  Despite attempts to minimize the possibility of a "labor" con-
struction to include "education",76 the flexibility in the construction of the term
"labor" by the courts justifies the opposition to the form of language used in the
Mass. 296, 302, 110 N. E. 301, 302 (1915); Paddock v. Balgord, 2 S. D. 100, 102, 48
N. W. 840, 841 (1891).
73. Johnson v. Citizen's Trust Co., 78 Ind. App. 487, 136 N. E. 49 (1922) (Exertion
of body or mind, or both for the accomplishment of an end); Dixon v. People, 168 I11.
179, 48 N. E. 108 (1897) (Intellectual exercise; mental effort, as the labor of compiling
a history); State v. Smith, 198 Pac. 879 (Okla. 1921) (Labor, in its usual sense, may be
defined as physical or mental toil; bodily or intellectual exertion); Ex parte Steiner, 68
Ore. 218, 225, 137 Pac. 204, 206 (1913) (Work requiring execution or effort, either
physical or mental). See also, Hightower v. Slaton, 54 Ga. 108, 21 Am. Rep. 273 (1875)
(held, a school teacher's salary is not liable to garnishment under statute declaring that
all journeymen, mechanics, and day laborers shall be exempt from process of garnishment,
"It is difficult to say that a teacher in a public or private school, who faithfully
performs his or her duty, is not as much a day laborer, within the meaning of the statute,
as an overseer.")
Bouvz's LAw DicrIoNARY (Rawle's 3d ed. 1914) defines labor as work requiring
exertion or effort, either physical or mental.
74. There is another source of danger to education if the amendment was incorporated
into the Constitution. Congress would probably be held to be invested with an implied
power to fix minimum educational standards which persons under eighteen would be
obliged to attain before being allowed to work. This would give the central government
an indirect control over education. Evidence that the Congress which submitted the
amendment regarded such a grant as within its scope, is the address by Rep. Foster
delivered in anticipation of ratification shortly before the submission of the amendment
to the States. It was entitled, "What Kind of a Child Labor Law Should Congress Pass?"
and approximately one quarter was devoted to a discussion of the educational standards
to be incorporated in the law enacted after ratification. 65 CoNe. REc. 9786 (1924).
75. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1924). In this case a state sought
to enforce such improper legislation but it was declared unconstitutional as violative of the
due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. But if the proposed amendment gives
control over education to Congress, the due process clause in the Fifth Amendment would
not similarly restrain such legislation because (1) it would seem that due process had
been complied with and (2) the latter amendment would control over the former. Schick
v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 68 (1903).
76. Governor Lehman of New York: "It seems to me most difficult, even on technical or
legalistic grounds to say that labor means education or to confuse the two." N. Y. Times,
March 6, 1937, p. 4, col. 5; President Roosevelt: "It is, I am sure an unmerited inter-
pretation to suggest that under it . . . that it would interfere with accepted educational
practices. . . ." N. Y. Times, March 6, 1937, p. 1, col. 6.
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pending amendment. When viewed in the light of the judicial expansion of the
interstate commerce clause in recent decisions,77 it would seem that the
ambiguous term "labor" is capable of being interpreted to include education.
I. APPRAsING THE FUTURE
A. The Orginally Proposed Anendment
The possibility of the amendment's ratification in the future is problematical.
Although only eight states need certify their approval to the Secretary of State
to raise the number to the requisite thirty-six, the remaining twenty states which
have not ratified have repeatedly rejected the amendment.7 s Indicative of the
present attitude toward the proposed constitutional change is the significant fact
that nineteen of these twenty have made affirmative rejections within the last two
years while the twentieth, Virginia, reasserted its disapproval within the last three
years. The prospects of valid ratification are further complicated by constitu-
tional questions which have arisen. These questions are: (1) Must ratification
of an amendment take place within a reasonable time after its proposal by
Congress? (2) May a state reverse its deliberative refusal and later ratify?
(1) Exclusive of the "Bill of Rights" the longest period required for the
ratification of an amendment has been three years and six months, the shortest
has been nine months, and the average time required has been one year and
six months.79 The pending amendment was submitted to the states on June
2, 1924, and has been awaiting ratification for thirteen years and eleven months.
The ratifications of two of the states that approved the amendment, Kentucky
and Kansas, have been challenged on the ground that more than a reasonable
time has elapsed since it was submitted to the states by Congress.60 That such
a contention, if sustained, would be sufficient to prevent ratification does not
appear to be in dispute. Surely some limitation of time is implied which will
cause a proposed amendment tc become outworn because of inaction or negation
77. Congressional regulation of labor disputes in factories was held to be a proper
exercise of its power under the commerce clause. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937). Prohibition of certain articles in intertate com-
merce has generally been held a valid use of the power to regulate commerce. United States
v. Popper, 93 Fed. 423 (N. D. Cal. 1899) (obscene literature); Rupert v. Unitcd States,
1SI Fed. 87 (C.C. A. Sth, 1910) (wild game illegally killed); Brooks v. United States, 297
U. S. 124 (1936) (stolen automobiles); Gooch v. United State3, 297 U. S. 124 (1936)
(kidnapped persons).
78. The states so rejecting the amendment and the number of rejections are as follows:
Alabama (1), Connecticut (2), Delaware (2), Florida (3), Georgia (2), Louisiana (3),
Maryland (3), Massachusetts (5), Mississippi (2), Missouri (3), Nebraska (2), New York
(5), North Carolina (4), Rhode Lland (3), South Carolina (3), South Dakota (5), Ten-
nessee (2), Texas (5), Vermont (2), Virginia (2). See (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. S27.
79. Eleventh: 2 years, 4 months. Twelfth: 9 months. Thirteenth: 10 months. Four-
teenth: 2 years, 1 month. Fifteenth: 1 year, 1 month. Sixteenth: 3 years, 6 months.
Seventeenth: 1 year, 2 weeks. Eighteenth: 1 year, 1 month. Nineteenth: 1 year, 2
months. Twentieth: 11 months. Twenty-first: 9 months, 2 weeks.
So. Wise v. Chandler, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024 (Ky. 1937); Coleman v. Mlillr, 71 P. (2d)
518 (Kan. 1937).
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by the ratifying bodies.81 This view received the approbation of the Supreme
Court in Dillon v. Gloss8 2 wherein the Court, in speaking of Article V said:
"We do not find anything in the Article which suggests an amendment once
proposed is to be open to ratification for all time, or that ratification in some
of the States may be separated from that in others by many years and yet be
effective."8S3
The Kansas and the Kentucky courts accepted this dictum of the Supreme
Court.8 4 Nor did the courts differ as to the test to be applied to determine what
was a reasonable time. Both courts agreed that the ratifications of three-fourths
of the States must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of States, to
reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period.8,
However, the Kansas court concluded that the interest and agitation over the
amendment had continued since its submission, 0 and upheld Kansas' ratification.
The Kentucky court, on the other hand, concluded that under the circumstances
twelve and one-half years was not a reasonable time.8 7 In view of the period of
inactivity between 1927 and 1933 during which only one state took action upon
the amendment, it would seem that the holding of the Kentucky court is the
sounder interpretation of the facts.8 8
(2) An additional constitutional ground for invalidating the original amend-
ment was set down by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in denying the validity
of that state's ratification.8 9 The court based its decision 'on the proposition that
a state which has acted upon a proposed amendment, has exhausted its power
to act again, either by way of reversing a previous ratification or by way of
81. Otherwise, an amendment once proposed could, in lieu of action upon it, be held
pending forever. Four amendments proposed long ago, two in 1789, one in 1810 and
one in 1861 are still pending for ratification unless deemed to have died for lack of
ratification within a reasonable time.
82. 256 U. S. 368 (1921).
83. 256 U. S. 368, 374 (1921).
84. Wise v. Chandler, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024, 1034 (Ky. 1937); Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.
(2d) 518, 527 (Kan. 1937).
85. This contention was originally expressed by JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIoNs
(4th ed. 1887) § 585, and was approved by the Supreme Court in Dillon v. Gloss, 256
U. S. 368, 375 (1921).
86. Coleman v. Miller, 71 P. (2d) 518, 527 (Kan. 1937).
87. Wise v. Chandler, 108 S.W. (2d) 1024, 1034 (Ky. 1937). Twelve and one half
years had elapsed since the submission of the amendment and the ratification by Ken-
tucky. The time now has lengthened to thirteen years and eleven months.
88. Results of a poll on the child labor amendment conducted by the American Institute
of Public Opinion in the ten states which ratified more than ten years ago show an
overwhelming sentiment for the amendment. Note (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 1201, n. 41.
Courts of law, however, are not permitted to consider such hearsay evidence in weighing
their decisions.
The Kentucky Court stated in its opinion that since Congress attached a limitation of
seven years fo its submission of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Amendments It Is a
proper conclusion that Congress thereby expressed the view that seven years is a reason-
able limitation. The soundness of such an implication is greatly mitigated by the fact that
Congress rejected such a limitation to the Child Labor Amendment 65 CoNo. R e. 7297
(1924).
89. Wise v. Chandler, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024 (Ky. 1937).
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ratifying after earlier rejection. The Kansas court concurred 0 in holding that
a ratification was an act incapable of being rejected but dissented from the
ruling that a rejection was of equal finality. That rejection is an act which does
not destroy the power to ratify subsequently is a view which has the support
of precedent 91 and constitutional commentators.32 The principle upon which this
conclusion is based is that the power of amending is a power to ratify, not to
reject, since the contingency of rejection was not provided for in Article V.9
This would seem a rather nebulous foundation upon which to base the procedure
by which we are to amend our most important law.94 The mere fact that the
power to reject was not expressly mentioned in Article V does not support a
claim that an amendment can never be effectually and finally rejected or that
such was the attitude of the framers.a Since the assent of three-fourths of the
states is required for ratification, reason and the orderly procedure with which our
legislative government is carried on, would seem to warrant the conclusion that
when more than one-fourth have rejected, the amendment should be regarded as
dead.90 The right of a state to reverse a prior rejection before such positive
repudiation occurs would seem to be of the same nature as the right possessed by
members of legislative bodies to reverse their vote before the final vote is
announced.9 7
On the basis of the foregoing reasoning, it should logically follow that since
a state has the right to reverse a rejection, it should also be able to rescind an
approval before final ratification or rejection of the amendment. But the
doctrine that once a state has ratified an amendment, it has exhausted its power
to act is generally accepted9" and has the authority of precedent.09 Both the
90. Coleman v. fhiller, 71 P. (2d) 518 (Kan. 1937).
91. States which had previously rejected, were proclaimed to have validly ratified the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. LoNG, CAsEs o.N Co.sTnTUo.xoAL LIw (2d ed.
1932) 1156, 1157. The precedent established in the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is weakened by the fact that the conflicting actions were mostly by the military and
"Amnesty Proclamation" governments. See Wise v. Chandler, 103 S. W. (2d)
1024, 1029 (Ky. 1937). However, Ohio's ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment is un-
tainted by the confusion existing under the Reconstruction Acts.
92. JAausox, CoNsrruIO.vAL CONv r ,ox;s (4th ed. 1887) § 579; 1 Wxrouoinnv,
CoNsT-unio-qA LAw or Tm U N STATES (2d ed. 1929) 593.
93. This contention was originally suggested by Governor Bramlette of Kentucky, in
his message to the General Assembly of March 1, 1865.
94. Even conceding that the power of amending is a power to ratify and not to
reject and that a previous rejection does not operate to deprive an individual state of the
power of subsequent ratification, the contention that rejection by thirteen states cannot
operate as an effective rejection because they all possess power to ratify subsequently
would seem to be straining to a "drily logical conclusion".
95. The long period of time which the amendment of 1924 has been pending before
the states for approval has caused a bill forbidding any further action on the amendment,
to be introduced in the New York State Legislature. However, no action was taken upon
this proposal. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1938, p. 10, col 3.
96. See Grinnel, A "Point of Order" on the Child Control Amendment (1934) 20 A. B.
A. J. 448.
97. Cus=Nr., MLkNuAL or PAPSzATARY Prtcn (1907) 152, 153. See also note
96, supra.
93. 1 WmLLOuGHBy, Cosrruo.AL LAw oF TH Uz,=rr STAs (2d ed. 1929) 594;
Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution (1921) 30 YA= L. 3. 321. But see contra,
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Kentucky and Kansas courts accepted this view.100 In practical application the
rule might prove to be unwise. In the instant amendment, if the people of a
state which had ratified, decided through their duly elected legislators that,
because of the decrease in the number of child workers and the elevation of the
standard of state laws, they wished to revoke a ratification issued thirteen years
ago, they would be precluded from doing so. Such a result would seem to
subvert the right of the people. Whether the Supreme Court would entertain
a suit to clarify the procedural requirements necessary to amend our Constitution
was a matter of doubt. Before a proclamation of ratification, the petitioners
could be held to have no standing to challenge the validity of the resolution 1
and after the proclamation the Court could hold this conclusive upon them.102
But the Court has decided to settle the conflict between the Kansas and the
Kentucky courts and has granted certiorari'03 to review the decision of the
Kansas court and to determine the legal status of the proposed amendment. But
even if the Supreme Court solves the constitutional difficulties in favor of the
validity of the amendment of 1924, the prospect of the proponent's securing the
eight more approvals which are necessary for ratification, is rather dubious. For
this reason, a resort to another solution might be the quicker way of securing
desirable legislation.
B. The Vandenberg Amendment
Because the language of the proposed child labor amendment of 1924 is so
needlessly broad and definitely objectionable and because some of the opponents
of the orginal amendment still feel that there is a need for an amendment, an
alternative amendment was proposed by Senator Vandenberg and was reported
unanimously to the Senate by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.10 4 The
pertinent language of the proposal is contained in Section I:
Grinnell, Finality of State's Ratification of a Constitutional Amendment (1925) 11 A. B.
A. J. 192.
99. New York withdrew her consent to the Fifteenth Amendment but was included in
the proclamation of the Secretary of State. 16 STAT. 1131 (1870). This precedent is weak-
ened by the fact that New York's approval was not needed to incorporate the Amendment
into the Constitution. Several states sought to rescind their approvals to the Fourteenth
Amendment but were included in the proclamation of the Secretary of State. However the
Secretary of State expressed doubt as to the validity of his action. 15 STAT. 706 (1868).
These ratifications were necessary for the amendment. When subsequent states ratified and
removed the necessity for the revoked ratifications, the Secretary of State again pro-
claimed the ratification of the Amendment. 15 STAT. 708 (1868). He included the revoked
ratification again in his proclamation.
100. Coleman v. Miller, 71 P. (2d) 518 (Kan. 1937); Wise v. Chandler, 108 S. W. (2d)
1024 (Ky. 1937). For excellent discussions of these cases, see (1937) 37 COL. L. Rrv. 1201;
(1937) 47 YA. L. J. 148.
101. Tyler v. Judges, 179 U.S. 405 (1900); Williams v. Riley, 280 U. S. 78 (1929); Ex
parte Albert Levitt, 82 L. Ed. 1 (U. S. 1937).
102. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130 (1922.); see (1937) 37 CoL. L. Rv. 1201; (1937)
47 YALE L. J. 148. Cf. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1920); United States v.
Sprague, 282 U. S. 716 (1931).
103. (1938) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 869.
104. Seventy-fifth Congress, 1st Session, S. J. Res. 144. Reported to Senate June 21,
1937.
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'"The Congress shall have power to limit and prohibit the employment for
hire of persons under sixteen years of age."' 0 5
The Vandenberg proposal, by limiting its scope to the abolition of the evils of
child labor, obviates some of the objections directed against the first form of the
child labor amendment. This was accomplished by substituting "employment
for hire" for the all-inclusive term "labor"; by omitting the word "regulate"
with all its broad implications and by limiting Congressional power to direct
prohibitions to persons under sixteen who are employed for hire. Thus, if
submitted to the States for ratification, this amendment would present only the
question as to whether there should be a constitutional amendment at all.
Inquiry would be limited to the question Wthether the present day needs of child
labor reform require an additional centralization of government and a con-
sequent weakening of states' rights-a result that any like amendment must
effect.
Other solutions to control the evils of child labor have been offered which do
not necessitate amending the Constitution. Before considering them it might
be well to appraise the present day needs by an examination of existing state
legislation. Every state in the union now has child labor and compulsory school
attendance laws. 06 All the states, with the exception of Wyoming which is not a
manufacturing state, prohibit the employment in factories of minors at least under
14 years of age. In thirteen states, the minimum age for employment in
factories is 15 or 16 years; forty-four states and the District of Columbia require
employment certificates for children employed in regulated occupations. These
laws are supplemented by compulsory school attendance requirements. Every
state requires school attendance at least to the age of 14. Thirty states and
the District of Columbia require attendance up to the age of 16. Thirteen of
the states have raised their standards to the ages of 17 or 18 but with certain
exemptions permitting legal employment after 14, 15 or 16. It is fair and rea-
sonable to presume that the sharp drop in the number of child workers, from
18 per cent of all children between 10 and 15 years of age in 1910 to 4.7 per cent
105. There are two additional sections to the Amendment:
"Section 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by this article except that
the operation of State laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to
legislation enacted by the Congress. I
"Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the
Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by
the Congress."
It will be noted that Sec. 2 incorporates the same language contained in Sec. 2 of the
original amendment. Sec. 3 contains two innovations. The time limit of seven years
in which the ratification must take place in order to be valid follows the precedents Est
by Congress in prescribing a simila limitation upon the Eighteenth, Twentieth and
Twenty-first Amendments. The provision calling for ratification by conventions instead
of by legislatures was introduced because it is thought that this method will be likely to
bring about an early decision for or against ratification. (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 321.
106. The authority for this and succeeding statements will be found in Coux&2', Crxn
L~AoR AmD CommuLsoRY ScuooL ATrrmm.%cz L. w or ALL Tim 48 STATu (1936). This
is an official document prepared by the Division of Review of the National Recovery Ad-
ministration, Work Materials § 72.
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in 1930,107 has been largely due to successful state regulation; a contributing
factor has been the vast change in moral and economic viewpoints resulting from
the publicity given to the plight of the child workers. With this picture in mind
we proceed to a consideration of the solutions which, if acceptable, would
obviate the necessity of an amendment.
C. Uniform Child Labor Act
In point of time, the first solution offered as an alternative to the proposed
amendment of 1924 was the Uniform Child Labor Act. After many years of
scientific study, the National Conference of Commissio*ners on Uniform State
Laws, approved this act in 1930.108 This Uniform Act allows work between
the ages of 14 and 18 years, provided the employer procures a permit issued
according to provisions of the Act. In order to obtain a permit the minor must
present evidence of (1) age,109 (2) schooling," 0 (3) physical fitness,' and
(4) the nature of the prospective employment." 2  Children engaged in agri-
culture, domestic service and athletic games are excluded from the provisions of
the Act. These exemptions were made for the sake of uniformity, and because
it is generally thought that such employments are, by their nature, healthful
and not excessively burdensome. Other noteworthy sections of the Act provide
for an eight-hour day, a minimum age of 18 years for work in mines or quarries,
and an enumeration of dangerous occupations in which children under 16, 18
and 21 may not be employed." 3 The Uniform Child Labor Act has much to
commend it. Its provisions for the issuance of permits seem a sound method of
completely abolishing the evils of child labor." 4 However, the efficiency of
the Act is strongly doubted since recalcitrant states with subnormal labor laws
could still ship child-labor products into the states accepting the Uniform Act.
Its success depends upon uniform passage by all states-an end hardly possible
of attainment. Because of these facts and also because of the clamor for a child
107. ABSTRACT OF THE Fn-rEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES (1930) 369.
108. There was an earlier UNmRom CIWD LAnoR Acr approved by the Conference in
1911. This was enacted into the laws of Kentucky (1914), Massachusetts (1913) and
Mississippi (1914). Utah accepted the act with modifications in 1915.
109. Since it has been found that much deception has been practiced in this matter,
the Act requires evidence of a searching nature. U. C. L. A. § 9.
110. In the case of work during school hours, the Act requires a completion of the eighth
grade. In work outside of school hours, the approval of the head of the school is required
to show that the candidate is capable to undertake such work in addition to his school
work. U. C. L. A, § 10.
111. This is evidenced by a certificate of physical fitness issued by a public physician.
U. C. L. A. § 11.
112. This is to consist of a statement signed by the prospective employer promising
to give employment and setting forth the nature of the work. If such employment is not
given within two months, the permit is void. U. C. L. A. § 12.
113. The complete text of the Act may be found in (1937) 2 MARTINDALE-HUDUELL
LAW DmEcToRy, part III.
114. The feasibility of the permit method of control is vouched for by Miss Grace
Abbott who testified, "The work-permit system is at the bottom of the enforcement of
the Child Labor Law, and through the machinery involved in the issuance of work-
permits it is possible to reduce the necessity for Federal action to a minimum". 65 CoNo.
REc. 7179 (1924).
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labor amendment in recent years, the Act has received scant attention. To date
it has been accepted in only one jurisdiction, the District of Columbia.
D. The Present Status of Hammer v. Dagcnhart
Another possible solution of the child labor debacle, which has come to the
forefront of late, is the passage of an act by Congress patterned along the
same lines as the previous attempt at federal child labor legislation"n declared
unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart.n" It may well be that such an enact-
ment, at the present day, would be upheld by the Supreme Court, as within the
Constitution. The ruling of the Court in the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart has
been severely criticized,117 and it appears, justly so. The question presented to
the Court was whether the power given to Congress to regulate interstate
commerce includes authority to prohibit the transporthtion between states of
goods produced by child labor. That Congress has the power to prohibit certain
articles from moving in interstate commerce was well settled by previous de-
cisions of the Supreme Court, which upheld the ban on the interstate shipment
of lottery tickets," 8 impure foods,"09 women for immoral purposes,12 3 and
liquor.12 1 These decisions were distinguished by the following language:
"In each of these instances the use of interstate transportation was necessary
to the accomplishment of harmful results. In other words, although the power
over interstate transportation was to regulate, that could only be accomplished by
prohibiting the use of the facilities of interstate commerce to effect the evil in-
tended. This element is wanting in the present case."'1-
But it appears that there is an evil effected in the states into which the goods are
shipped, in that these states would be likely to postpone enacting child labor laws
in order to avoid placing on their manufacturers the burden of competing with
rivals in other states which possess a cheaper labor market. But even conceding
with the majority that this evil is not present, it would seem that Congress has
supreme control over interstate commerce even though its purpose in exercising
this control is for the welfare of children. Under the Articles of Confederation,
the states retained their right to dictate what commerce could be carried on
with the other states. 23 This power embraced the privilege of barring products
of other states for purely arbitrary reasons. The states relinquished this
115. Such a law is pending before the House of Repre-entatives. H. R. 2605.
116. 247 U. S. 251 (1915).
117. Gordon, The Child Labor Law Case (1918) 32 HaV. L. RPm. 45; Sutherland,
The Child Labor Cases (1923) S Cop-,. L. Q. 338; Jones, The Child Labor Decision (1918)
6 CArir. L. REv. 395; Bikle, Commzerce and Power and Hammer v. Dascnharl (1919) 67
U. or PA. L. REv. 21 (1919).
118. Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
119. Hipoite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45 (1911).
120. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913); Caminetti v. United States, 242
U. S. 470 (1917).
121. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Ald. Ry., 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
122. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 271 (1918). The court also distinguV-hes
this case from the previous cases on the ground that here the goods are barmlezs con-
modities while in the other instances they were not. It is difficult to reconcile this
reasoning with the White Slave cases, stpra, note 120.
123. ARcnz.s or CoI,-rnERATo,;, Art. IX, 1 U. S. C. A. § 12 (1935).
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authority and conferred it upon Congress by the following broad language of the
Constitution:
"The Congress shall have power ... (3) to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."'
124
It would seem that this complete power possessed by the states was ceded to
Congress. If Congress uses it to promote the general welfare, it is not for the
states to object, for as was stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in the dissenting
opinion:
"The act does not meddle with anything belonging to the States.... But when
they seek to send their products across the state line they are no longer within
their rights. ... It (Congress) may carry out its views of public policy, what-,
ever indirect effect they may have upon the activities of the states.' 1 25
The decision reached by the Supreme Court in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,126 which expressly overruled 127 a prior decision of the Court,128 has given
rise to a belief that Hammer v. Dagenkart might also be discarded. 120 How-
ever, it is doubtful whether the Court would go so far if Congress should seek
again to control child labor directly by virtue of its power over interstate com-
merce. The Court gave a conservative construction to the commerce clause in
invalidating the N.R.A.130 and the Guffey Coal Act,' 3 ' both of these being
laws by which Congress attempted to regulate manufacturing. However, in
the Wagner Act Cases'32 the Court held that since the bulk of raw materials
used, as well as most of the articles produced, crossed state lines, the manu-
facturing plants were engaged in interstate commerce. The basis of this broad
decision would seem to be the right of Congress to protect interstate com-
merce. Here, it was found that a strike due to the refusal of the employer
to bargain collectively would have a "most serious effect on interstate com-
merce."' 33 This element seems to be lacking in the case of a manufacturing
124. UNITED STATES CONST., Art I, § 8, cl. 3. It would seem that the linking in the
same sentence of the grant of control of interstate commerce with the grant of control of
commerce with foreign nations is an indication that the drafters intended to give Congress
equal power in both grants. That its power to regulate foreign commerce is complete
is not disputed.
125. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 281 (1918).
126. 300 U. S. 379 (1937). This case upheld the right of a State to enact a minimum
wage law for women.
127. 300 U. S. 379, 400 (1937).
128. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
129. It is true that these cases are concerned with the due process clause while the
problem of the constitutionality of a child labor law would be under the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. But the decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish shows a liberal tendency on the part of the Court. It is significant that both the
Adkins case which was overruled and Hammer v. Dagenhart were both five to four
decisions.
130. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
131. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
132. National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937);
National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (1937); National Labor
Re]. Bd. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58 (1937).
133. National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 41 (1937).
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plant employing child labor, even though such plant received its raw materials
from foreign states and sold its products beyond state lines. The fact that
child labor was or was not employed would have little effect on interstate
commerce. The rule expressed in Hamner v. Dagenhart, that the evil sought
to be corrected by Congress by the exclusion of products from interstate
commerce must come into being after the completion of the interstate ship-
ment' 34 was restated by the Court in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois
Central Railwaylas in harmonizing the latter decision with the Child Labor
case. Thus it would appear that in order for the Court to sustain a direct
Congressional prohibition on the products of child labor, it would be necessary
to establish that some harm would be accomplished in the state of destination.
It would be possible to prove that some evil was effected,' 30 and a liberal court
might deem it a sufficient excuse for the exercise by Congress of its power over
interstate commerce, even though the police power of the sending state be in-
cidentally effected. However, recent developments in constitutional law have
uncovered a solution which might preclude the problem in Hammer v. Dagen-
hart from being presented to the Court again.
E. National and State Cooperation
The Supreme Court in Whitfield v. Ohio13 T upheld the validity of the Hawes-
Cooper Act 3 s which made the products of convict labor, shipped in interstate
commerce, subject to the laws of the state of destination. This principle was
further extended by the Ashurst-Summers Act' 39 which forbade the introduc-
tion into interstate commerce of prison-made goods intended to be sold in
violation of the laws of the state of destination and required the labeling of
all such goods, regardless of where they were shipped. This legislation has
been declared constitutional in the epochal case of Kentucky Whip & Collar
Co. v. Illinois Central Ry. 40 The wide ramifications of the joinder of state
and national legislation to outlaw economic evils are at once apparent.
Specifically, the possibility that similar complementary state and federal legis-
lation might prove to be the solution to the child labor problem, has been
much discussed. 4' It would seem that Congress has the power to prohibit the
shipment of the products of child labor in interstate commerce if they are
134. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 271, 272 (1918).
135. 299 U. S. 334, 350 (1936).
136. See p. 233, supra.
137. 297 U. S. 431 (1936); see, Note (1936) 49 HAnv. L. Rnv. IC07; Note (1936)
24 GEo. L. Q. 1013; Note (1936) 34 MTcE. L. Rsv. 1244.
138. 45 STAT. 1084 (1929), 49 U. S. C. A. § 60 (1927).
139. 49 STAT. 494 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 61-64 (1927).
140. 299 U. S. 334 (1937); see Note (1937) 6 Forania, L. REv. 299; Note (1937)
23 VA. L. Rxv. 584; Note (1937) 85 U. or PA. L. ,rv. 529.
141. The current comment is optimistic as to the constitutionality of such legislation.
See Chambliss, Constitutional Code Control (1936) 30 Irx,. L. R . 829; Cormin, National-
State Cooperation-Its Present Possibilities (1937) 46 YAMz L. J. 599; Fraenl: , Corstitu-
tional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1936 Tern (1937) 86 U. or P. L. RE-v. 38, 44;
Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes, II (1935) 49 HtAv. L. R v. 193, 231-34; Ribblve
National and State Cooperation Under the Commerce Clause (1937) 37 Cor. L. REv. 43.
19381
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
intended to be sold in violation of the laws of the receiving state. The requisite
which was lacking in Hammer v. Dagenhart42 i.e., that the evil should come
into existence after the use of the channels of interstate commerce, seems to be
supplied by the possible violation of the law of the state of destination. That
there would be no enlargement of the powers of Congress in upholding such a law
is confirmed by the Court in the Kentucky Whip Case: 143
"The Congress has not sought to exercise a power not granted or to usurp
the police powers of the States. It has not acted on any assumption of a
power enlarged by virtue of state action. The Congress has exercised its
plenary power.... "
There is greater doubt, however, as to the validity of the complementary
state law prohibiting the sale of the products of child labor. The due process
objections can probably be refuted by the decision in Whitfield v. Ohio' 44
which decided that when the statutory provisions apply alike to citizens of
the home state and to those of the foreign state the privileges and immunities
of the citizen are not affected. Since the domestic citizen probably could not
complain of being deprived of property without due process,1 45 the foreign
citizen could not. But a serious question arises as to whether the underlying
state legislation might not be condemned as, in effect, creating interstate
tariffs. Such state legislation, standing alone, would surely be invalid 140 but
with Congressional consent a state may interfere with interstate commerce. 147
To what extent Congress may consent to a state's invoking Congressional
powers in this field remains to be limited by the Court. 48  If abused, this
consent doctrine may have to be limited in order to preserve our dual system
of government. However, it would seem that the Court would permit the use
of this method of cooperative action to control child labor.149 That such legis-
lation will soon be in force appears to be likely. Misouri, 5 o Vermont' 01
and New York' 52 have already enacted underlying laws dealing with the abuses
of child labor, along the lines pointed out by the decisions of the Supreme
142. ;47 U. S. 251 (1918).
143. 299 U. S. 334, 352 (1937).
144. 297 U. S. 431, 437 (1936).
145. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
146. Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935).
147. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936).
See also Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 209 (1936) (per-
mitting a state to tax an instrumentality of the central government if the central govern-
ment consents).
148. Cf. Ashton v. Cameron County W. I. 'Dist. No. One, 298 U. S. 513 (1936).
149 See note 141, supra.
150. Mo. ST. AiqN. (Supp. 1937) § 14094-1-2-3-4.
151. VT. Ptu. LAWS (1937) § 176, No. 8.
152. N. Y. GE. Bus. LAW (1937) § 69a-b-c-d This statute provides that no goods
produced by the employment of persons under sixteen years of age in or for a factory
or a mine or by industrial homework shall be sold in this state, no matter where pro-
duced. A violation of this law constitutes a misdemeanor. There is also a saving clause
as to other laws regulating child labor in New York.
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Court and the supplementary federal legislation is now pending in Congress.2
1 3
The feasibility of such legislation has been questioned.1 54 But it would seem
that with the aid of label provisions similar to that incorporated in the
Ashurst-Summers Act,1 55 the cooperation of state and national agencies would
provide an effective means of enforcement. A meritorious feature of this solu-
tion is the fact that once a huge consumer-state such as New York closes its
market to products of child labor, the recalcitrant states will be apt to raise
their standards in order to preserve this market.
Coywlusion
Although the evils of child labor have been greatly abated during the last
two decades, the problem is still of such magnitude as to demand further legis-
lative action.10 6 Despite the gradual decrease in the number of child workers
during a period when regulatory measures have been chiefly confined to
legislation by the states alone, it nevertheless appears that some sort of appro-
priate Federal assistance would be advisable at this time as a means of hasten-
ing the end of this serious problem. It is very likely that such Federal aid
will soon be forthcoming but the form that such aid will take still remains in
doubt. The selection of a proper remedy is of vital importance.
The originally proposed child labor amendment should not be chosen as
the solution to the problem. Its needlessly broad language would place in
jeopardy some of our most cherished rights, a risk not commensurate with the
gains of whatever beneficial child labor legislation might result from its incor-
poration into the Constitution. Whether the necessity of the situation calls
for the substitute Vandenberg Amendment's becoming a part of our funda-
mental law is a matter of some doubt. However, the number of child vorkers
that should be in existence to make a case for a constitutional change, and
a further weakening of states' rights is rather difficult to affix. In view of
153. Wheeler-Johnson bill (S-2226). This bill passed the Senate, 81 Co!;G. Rc 11937
(1937), but was referred to the Committee on Labor in the House, 81 Com. Rac. 12193
(1937).
154. Luamx & WAGNER, Cmen Woxnms nir Aam=ncA (1937) vi.
155. 49 STAT. 494, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 61-64 (Supp. 1935). See Kentucky Whip & Collar
Co. v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 299 U. S. 334, 352 (1936).
156. A significant cross-section of legal opinion regarding the comparative merits of
the proposed remedies is found in the poll of the American Bar Association. The follow-
ing is a summary of the questions submitted together with the results of the vote:
(1) Should the Constitution be amended to give to the Congress powers as to the
employment of children in industry? Yes, 7,513. No, 6,126.
(2) Should the amendment submitted to the States in 1924 be ratified? Yes, 2,743.
No, 10,840.
(3) As between the amendment submitted in 1924 and the Vandenberg Amendment
now before the Senate, of which would you prefer the ratification? 1924 Amendment,
1,797. Vandenberg Amendment, 11,254.
(4) Should the proposed Vandenberg Amendment be submitted and ratified? Yes,
7,729. No, 5,777.
(5) Should the Wheeler-Johnson bill be enacted? Yes, 6,347. No, 6,907. N. Y. L. J,
Dec. 6, 1937, p. 2002, col 1.
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the solution revealed by the decisions in the Prison Goods cases, 151 it would
seem politically unwise at this time to so amend our Constitution. This remedy
of national and state cooperation has the virtue of preserving state control.
Because of the alarming increase in national bureaucracy, this advantage alone
merits that solution a trial. This compromise seems capable of removing the
last stages of child labor from the American scene.
PIAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN WARRANTIES OF SALE OF GOODS-CONTRACTUAL
DISCLAIMRS.-A cursory examination of bargains for the sale of personalty
will indicate that warranty representations are matters of recurring dispute,
and that in such transactions the time-honored and precautionary formalities
impressed upon realty transfers are usually lacking. In the feudal system the
transfer of personalty did not attain the dignity and solemnity of a sale of
realty. The transfer of a chattel was, and was treated as, relatively unim-
portant; it was carried through with informality. Litigation over the terms
of the transfer resulted. These personal dealings, and over the counter sales
of chattels, not unsuited to an age of informal barter, are rapidly being over-
shadowed by modem business practice. In the course of a century the eco-
nomic world has seen the transition of sales agreements from the setting and
practices of the small town or sea port to the intricate commercial processes
of the present day,1 but the litigation over the terms of the sales contract
continues. The outcome of such litigation often depends upon the effective
proving of warranties alleged to have been made by the seller. If the contract
had consisted of written or printed matter, the proof of the warranty is de-
pendent upon the exclusionary effect of the parol evidence doctrine. It is this
relationship of the parol evidence rule and the warranty obligation which will
be treated here.
Clarity requires that the commentary be divided into the following topics:
I. The History and Nature of the Parol Evidence Rule; II. The Completeness
of the Written Contract; III. Warranties as Collateral Agreements; IV. The
Express Warranty; V. The Restatement on Express Warranties; VI. The Im-
plied Warranties; VII. The Express Warranty Excluding the Implied War-
ranty; VIII. Written Disclaimers of Warranties.
I. THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The doctrine of parol evidence, that oral testimony is inadmissible to con-
tradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a valid written contract,
has found general acceptance in the common law; despite this general ac-
ceptance, however, few principles in the realm of jurisprudence have been so
subject to diversified opinion and contradictory application. The testing
ground for the doctrine is the heavily litigated field of warranties of personal
property.
Originally, no unique validity attached per se to written forms.2 The truth
157. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois
Central Ry., 299 U. S. 334 (1936).
1. LTZWLLYNr, CASES AND MATMIALS ON ma LAw OF SALES (1930) 204.
2. The fact was that the writing did not legally establish anything. 5 WomoR, Evi-
DENcE (2d ed. 1923) § 2426.
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